[Expert Solution]: Suzanne Koemer, Individually and as Executrix…

Suzanne Koemer, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Suzanna Stica, Deceased AHS Hospital corp., et al. MRS-L-2983-13 1. BACKGROUND This is a medical malpractice case that arises out of the resuscitation of patient who had executed “Do not resuscitate” (DNR) and “Do not intubate (DNI) orders prior to her resuscitation from cardiac arrest at Defendant Morristown Medical Center. Plaintiff Suzanne Koerner (daughter of decedent) individually and as Executrix of the Estate of her mother, Suzanna Stica, alleges that Defendants AHS Hospital Corp., Morristown Medical Center, Andrew Youssouf, M.D., Erin Heritage-Peek, M.D., Peter Roytman, M.D., Raunaq Bhatt, M.D. and four named nurses failed to honor the decedent’s DNR/DNI orders and improperly resuscitated decedent which caused decedent to endure unwanted pain and suffering. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the prolonging of her mother’s life, she had very poor quality of life in her final six months and endured unwanted pain and suffering. This is a case of first impression in New Jersey. Defendants A-HS/BÆVIC filed a motion for summary judgment last year which the other Defendants joined in. At that time, the Defendants argued that the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief for “wrongful life” or “vvrongful prolongation of life.” Plaintiff opposed the Defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment. After a lenghy argument before the Court last October, the motions were denied. The Defendants now seek reconsideration of that ruling. For the purposes of the underlying motion the following facts are uncontested. On November 29, 2011, Ms. Stica was brought from her assisted living community to Mon•istown Medical Center emergency department with complaints of breathing problems. At the time, Ms. Stica was eighty nine years old and her medical records indicated that she had previously executed “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR) and “Do Not Intubate” (DNI) orders, otherwise known as advance medical directives. Ms. Stica’s DNR ordered her physicians and medical providers not to resuscitate her in the event that she suffered a cardiac arrest. The next day while undergoing a Doppler procedure, Ms. Stica went into cardiac arrest. Despite having a DNR, the staff resuscitated Ms. Stica and she lived another six months before dying. Plaintiff claims that following the resuscitation, Ms. Stica suffered from a poor or diminished quality of life, which included: being intubated agaigst her wishes, daily pain due to her arthritic condition, diffculty breathing from end stage lung disease, confinement to a wheelchair, difficulty eating due to a breathing problem, chest pain, bowel and bladder problems, increased depression and dementia, increased incidents of falling down, suffered a stroke making it difficult for her to communicate, speak, and eat. (Plaintiffs Answers to Uniform A (1) interrogatories). In their motion for reconsideration, Defendants argue that their motion for summary judgment should have been granted because the New Jersey Advance Directive for Health Care Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2H-73, immunizes health care providers and institutions when lifesaving care is in violation of a DNR directive. Secondly, they argue that the Court erred in extending the concepts developed in the “wrongful birth” cases l in order to recognize a new cause of action for “wrongful prolongation of life.” Lastly, they argue that the Court’s decision 1 Berman v Allan 80 N.J. 421 (1979) and Procanik by Procanik v. Cilia, 97 N.J. 339 (1984) and 226 NJ. super. 132 (App. Div. 1988). Schroeder v. Perkel 87 N.J. 53 (1981) to deny summary judgment based upon a trend in other jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action for ‘%ønongful prolongation of life” was palpably unreasonable. Il. Reconsideration Standard “[R]econsideration is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court, to be exercised in the interest ofjustice.” Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration is only appropriate “for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.” Id. (citing D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990). A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a second bite at the apple. It is not a mechanism for unhappy litigants to attempt once more to air their positions and re-litigate issues already decided. see Michel v. Michel, 210 N.J. super. 218, 224 (Ch. Div. 1985). Moreover, a party carmot rely on facts that were not raised in the initial motion to justify reconsideration when those facts were either known or could have been known at the time of the initial hearing. Del Vecchio v. Hemberger, 388 N.J. Super. 179, 189 (App. Div. 2006). Ill. Anal